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Abstract
We examine the eﬀect of trust on ﬁnancial investment and contracting decisions in a
micro-economic environment where trust is exogenous. Using hand-collected data on
European venture capital, we show that the Eurobarometer measure of trust among
nations signiﬁcantly aﬀects investment decisions. This holds even after controlling for
investor and company ﬁxed eﬀects, geographic distance, information and transaction
costs. The national identity of venture capital ﬁrms’ individual partners further con-
tributes to the eﬀect of trust. Education and work experience reduce the eﬀect of
trust but do not eliminate it. We also examine the relationship between trust and
sophisticated contracts involving contingent control rights and ﬁnd that, even after
controlling for endogeneity, they are complements, not substitutes.
JEL CODES: G24, G34, K22, L14, M13, O16.
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Many economists intuitively recognize the importance of trust for economic transactions.
Since Arrow’s (1973) remark that “virtually every commercial transaction has within itself
an element of trust” a small literature has analyzed the role of trust in economic decisions.
For example, the work of Knack and Keefer (1997), Temple and Johnson (1998), and
Zak and Knack (2001) establishes a positive relationship between trust and economic
growth. More recently, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2009) study the importance of trust
for bilateral trade in goods, ﬁnancial assets, and direct foreign investment, and Guiso,
Sapienza and Zingales (2008) use Dutch and Italian data to establish an eﬀect of trust on
stock market participation.
In this paper we ask whether trust among nations aﬀects the decision to make an in-
vestment across diﬀerent countries. We also ask whether trust aﬀects ﬁnancial contracting
and test whether trust and sophisticated contracts are substitutes or complements. We
use a unique hand-collected dataset of European venture capital investments that allows
us to study the eﬀect of trust on ﬁnancial investments and contracts using a powerful
ﬁxed-eﬀect identiﬁcation strategy.
Following the social capital literature, we deﬁne trust as a subjective belief about the
likelihood that a potential trading partner will act honestly. It is important to distinguish
two diﬀerent types of trust. Generalized trust pertains to the preconceptions that people of
one identiﬁable group have for people from another identiﬁable group. Personalized trust,
instead, concerns the evolving relationship between two speciﬁc agents. In this paper we
focus solely on generalized trust, so that we are concerned with what might be considered
cursory beliefs, generalizations about others, even stereotypes.
Our ﬁrst question is whether generalized trust aﬀects the likelihood that a venture
capital ﬁrm will invest in a start-up company. Prior to investing, there is a search process
where entrepreneurs vie for the attention of venture capitalists, which in turn, have to incur
time and costs in screening potential deals. We hypothesize that higher trust facilitates
this matching process. Moreover, we conjecture that in addition to the country location of
the venture capital ﬁrm, the nationality and personal characteristics of individual venture
capital partners also aﬀect the trust relationship with entrepreneurs, and therefore the
likelihood of investing.
Our second question concerns the eﬀect of trust on contracting. We identify two
contrasting views. The ‘substitutes’ hypothesis argues that sophisticated contracts can
be used to overcome low trust between investors and entrepreneurs. The ‘complements’
hypothesis argues that investors make use of sophisticated contracts only when there is
suﬃcient trust. The diﬀerence between the two hypotheses concerns investors’ beliefs
about contract enforceability. Under the substitutes hypothesis, enforcement is taken for
granted, and investors trade-oﬀ the costs and beneﬁts of using contractual sophistication:
they make use of sophisticated contracts only in the absence of trust. By contrast, under
the complements hypothesis, two parties do not ﬁnd worthwhile to write a sophisticated
contract if they have low trust in their counterparts’ nation.
We examine these two questions in the context of venture capital investment and
1contracting decisions. Venture capital provides a particularly attractive testing ground for
the eﬀects of trust. On the one hand, one can reasonably argue that venture capitalists are
sophisticated investors who would not act upon poorly-informed priors, and who are well
positioned to exploit any arbitrage opportunities. On the other hand, one might counter
that the ﬁnancing of new companies inherently involves limited hard information, high
(Knightian) uncertainty, and considerable scope for opportunistic behavior. Investors can
therefore be more prone to rely on soft information, including social beliefs such as trust.
We use a hand-collected dataset of European venture capital investments made be-
tween 1998 and 2001 that contains investors and companies from 15 European countries,
Norway, Switzerland, and the US. The dataset contains detailed information that cannot
be obtained from any commercially available database, including the experience, education
and nationality of each venture capital partner and some features of the contracts used
for ﬁnancing. One of the advantages of using microeconomic data is that reverse causality
can be safely dismissed: trust among nation can aﬀect venture capital investments, but
the venture capital industry is clearly too small to inﬂuence the trust among nations.
Given the inherently subjective nature of trust, it is appropriate to measure it by
surveying opinions. We adopt the approach of Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2009) of
using the Eurobarometer survey data of bilateral trust among nations. This measure is
based on how much citizens of one country say they trust the citizens of each other country
(including their own).
We obtain three major ﬁndings. First, we ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of trust on investments.
The eﬀect is highly signiﬁcant, both statistically and economically. A one percentage
point increase in those who have high trust towards another country implies a seven
percentage points increase in the probability that an investment is made. Our econometric
speciﬁcation considers all potential ﬁnancing deals between investors and companies in our
sample and asks which deals are actually realized. We account for any country-speciﬁc
factors, such as regulation, taxes, institutions or country-speciﬁc investment opportunities
using both investor ﬁxed eﬀects and company country ﬁxed eﬀects (company ﬁxed eﬀects in
conditional logit models). The ﬁxed eﬀects also take care of any investor-speciﬁce ﬀects,
like quality or attitudes towards risk, as well as for systematic diﬀerences in company
quality across countries. Therefore, the only variables that matter are those that measure
relative (or dyadic) distances between the investor and the company. We distinguish two
types of dyadic variables: those that vary at the country-pair level and those that vary
at the individual investor-company pair level. The Eurobarometer measure of generalized
trust is a country-dyadic variable. To isolate the eﬀect of trust and eliminate alternative
explanations we consider additional country-dyadic variables that control for diﬀerences
in GDP, legal origin, language overlap, common borders, and the amount of information
about foreign countries available in the business press. At the individual-dyadic level we
control for the actual distance between the investor’s and the company’s town. We also
control for the investor’s propensity to invest in the company’s stage and industry. To
rule out alternative explanations we also use some novel controls, such as a measure of
taste-based preferences that is based on the Eurovision song contest. We also provide
several robustness checks, including alternative ways of measuring trust.
Second, we ﬁnd that the eﬀe c to ft r u s t si sn o tc o n ﬁned to the organization as a whole,
but extends to its decision-makers. Venture capital investors are partnerships owned by a
small numbers of partners, who collectively decide on each investment. The inclusion of a
2foreign partner from the company’s country in a venture capital ﬁrm’ team is associated
with an increases in the likelihood of investment. An investment is also more likely if the
foreign partner is from a third country that has a higher level of trust in the company’s
countrymen than does the venture ﬁrm’s country. We are cautious on the causal inter-
pretations of these results, however, since foreign partners could be hired in anticipation
of making investments in that country. We also examine the importance of venture part-
ners’ experience and educational achievements. While the trust eﬀect is lower when the
partners have previous US work experience or are more educated, it nonetheless remains
positive and signiﬁcant. This suggests that education and experience mitigate but do not
eliminate the eﬀect of trust, even in the context of sophisticated professional investors.
Third, we ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant relationship between trust and contingent (i.e.,
sophisticated) contracts, consistent with the ‘complements’ hypothesis. This result holds
true across a variety of contingent control rights, pertaining to the composition of the
board of directors, the allocation of voting rights, the decision to liquidate the company’s
assets, and the ability to terminate the founders’ employment contract. It continues
to hold also when we control for potential selection eﬀects. Because the complements
hypothesis considers contract enforcement a driving force for the choice of contracts, we
also examine how the eﬀect of trust varies across legal enforcement regimes. Consistently
with the complements hypotheses, we ﬁnd that the eﬀect of trust on contingent contracting
is strongest when companies are located in countries with better legal enforcement.
We believe this paper is the ﬁrst to examine the eﬀect of generalized trust on corporate
ﬁnance transactions. Our results are novel and relevant for several reasons. Identifying a
trust eﬀect in a micro-economic environment where alternative explanations can be con-
trolled for is an important new step in establishing the importance of trust for investment
decisions. Our results also suggest that generalized trust matters even in sophisticated
ﬁnancial transactions, where one might expect its eﬀect to be eliminated by arbitrage.
Moreover, the strength of this eﬀect depends on individual investor characteristics. In
particular, the result that the eﬀect of trust is mitigated but not eliminated by the pres-
ence of partners with more experience or education suggests that trust is a fundamental
determinant of investment decisions. The result that trust and contingent contracts are
complements suggests that reliance on contracts need not be a solution to the problems
that arise when investors question the enforceability of contracts in the ﬁrst place. Gener-
alized trust is therefore an important force not only for the likelihood that a transaction
takes place, but also for shaping the contract which sustains the transaction.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1 reviews the relevant
literature. Section 2 develops the paper’s theoretical motivations. Section 3 explains our
data and variables. In Section 4 we examine the eﬀect of trust on investment formation and
the role of individual partners’ trust. Section 5 examines the eﬀect of trust on contracts,
and is followed by a conclusion.
1 Literature review
Our paper builds on, and contributes to a number of literatures. Most closely related is the
literature on the eﬀects of trust on ﬁnancial decisions. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2008)
document that trust aﬀects the willingness to invest money in shares, and thus contribute
3to explaining limited participation in the stock market. We examine the decision to
invest not by individuals who allocate their savings to liquid markets, but by sophisticated
ﬁnancial intermediaries that invest in illiquid companies.
By looking at cross-country investments, our paper also contributes to research on the
’home bias’ investment puzzle (see Bae, Stulz and Tan (2008), Bottazzi, Pesenti, and van
Wincoop (1996), French and Poterba (1991), and the survey by Karolyi and Stulz (2003)).
Our analysis goes beyond previous work by examining not only whether transactions occur,
but also how they are structured.1 This allows us to address important questions about
t h er o l eo ft r u s tf o rﬁnancial contracting that have not yet been studied.
Our paper makes a novel contribution to the venture capital literature. The paper
addresses deal formation, an issue that has received surprisingly little attention so far. It
introduces trust as an important factor in the generation and structuring of deals. Our
analysis also builds on previous research that explains the contractual features observed
in venture capital (see Bengtsson and Ravid (2009), Dessein (2005), Gompers (1997),
Hellmann (1998, 2006), and Kaplan and Strömberg (2003)), and on papers that examine
how legal systems inﬂuence venture capital contracts (see Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann
(2009), Cumming, Schmidt and Walz (2010), Kaplan, Martel and Strömberg (2007), and
Lerner and Schoar (2005)). By including investor country ﬁxed eﬀects our analysis al-
ready absorbs all cross-country diﬀerences in legal systems, so that the eﬀects of trust we
document go beyond diﬀerences in legal systems.
More broadly, our study contributes to the literature on the economic eﬀects of social
capital (see Durlauf and Fafchamps (2006) and Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006) for
recent surveys). Some of this literature has focused on the importance of trust in envi-
ronments where there is little legal enforcement. For example, Johnson, McMillan and
Woodruﬀ (2002) show that well-functioning courts are a prerequisite for entrepreneurs to
trust and contract with external suppliers. Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004) show
that social capital has a stronger eﬀect on ﬁnancial development where legal enforcement
is low. Our results on contracting show that, even with good legal enforcement, investors
do not rely on sophisticated contracting to overcome lack of trust. Ekinci, Kalemli-Ozcan,
and Sorensen (2007) investigate the eﬀect of social capital on ﬁnancial integration among
European regions, ﬁnding that regions where the level of conﬁdence and trust is high
are more ﬁnancially integrated with each other. Also related to our paper are Bloom,
Sadun, and van Reenen (2009), who analyze managerial practices at multinational com-
panies around the world. They show that ﬁrms located in areas with higher trust tend
to be in industries that rely on decentralization. Moreover, they ﬁnd that trust facilitates
delegation from the headquarters by improving cooperation. Finally, Guiso, Sapienza and
Zingales (2009) establish the importance of trust for aggregate trade and foreign direct in-
vestment ﬂows. We provide an analysis that is complementary yet distinct. Their analysis
remains at the macro level, i.e., at the level of country pairs. We are able to analyze data
at the level of individual investor-company pairs. This allows us to address a diﬀerent set
of questions, such as the importance of individual investor characteristics, or the eﬀect
of trust on contracts. It also permits us to control for a comprehensive set of alternative
explanatory factors, and thus to better isolate the role of trust. Because we focus on a
1Also related to our paper is Giannetti and Yafeh (2008), who study the eﬀect of culture on the
syndicated loan market. They ﬁnd that banks oﬀer smaller and more expensive loans to borrowers located
in culturally more distant countries.
4small segment of the economy, we can also safely eliminate any concerns about reverse
causality. We can thus bypass all the diﬃculties of having to ﬁnd appropriate instruments
for the determinants of trust.
2 Theoretical motivation
2.1 What is trust?
In this paper we use a commonly accepted deﬁnition of trust, as “the subjective proba-
bility with which an agent assesses that another agent or group of agents will perform a
particular action.”2 Two diﬀerent types of trust are relevant for our study: personalized
and generalized trust. Personalized trust is a set of beliefs that one person has about
the behavior of another speciﬁc person. It is based on a repeated interaction between
the two individuals and can thus be thought of as an informed belief. Generalized trust,
by contrast, is a set of beliefs about the behavior of a random member of an identiﬁ-
able group of individuals. Durlauf and Fafchamps (2006) argue that “the main diﬀerence
between the two is that, for each pair of newly matched agents, the former takes time
and eﬀort to establish, while the latter is instantaneous.” From an economics perspective,
the diﬀerence between generalized and personalized trust can be thought of as the diﬀer-
ence between poorly-informed prior beliefs versus well-informed posterior beliefs. From
an econometric perspective, a key diﬀerence is that generalized trust is exogenous to the
speciﬁc micro-economic transaction, whereas personalized trust is inherently endogenous.
This distinction is particularly relevant in the context of venture capital. A venture
capitalist and an entrepreneur typically do not know each other before contracting. After
investing, they work closely together (Hellmann and Puri (2002)). At the beginning of
their relationship, the (generalized) trust between a potential venture capitalist investor
and an entrepreneur is exogenous. Once their relationship has developed, trust becomes
personalized and endogenous to the numerous decisions and interactions made along the
way. In our study we focus solely on generalized trust.3
2.2 Why should trust aﬀect venture capital investments?
Our ﬁrst hypothesis is that higher generalized trust increases the likelihood that a venture
capitalist invests in an entrepreneur’s company. The underlying logic is that trust helps
the search process through which the two parties in the transaction ﬁnd each other and
make the investment decision. For example, a venture capital ﬁrm with low (generalized)
trust of an entrepreneur may never take much interest in her business plan. Indeed,
venture capitalists seriously consider only a small fraction of all business plans proposed
to them (Tyebjee and Bruno (1984)). Similarly, an entrepreneur who has low (generalized)
2A large literature which spans several social sciences examines the concept of trust and its eﬀects on
human behavior. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006), Möllering (2006), and Nooteboom (2002) review
this literature from diﬀerent angles.
3Another conceptual distinction is between trusting and trustworthiness (see Glaeser et al. (2000)).
Trusting describes a focal person’s beliefs about others, whereas trustworthiness describes other’s beliefs
about the focal person. In our context, the distinction between trusting and trustworthiness corresponds to
the distinction between the venture capitalists’ trust of entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs’ trust of venture
capitalists.
5trust of a venture capital ﬁrm may never bother to initiate contact. Indeed, entrepreneurs
typically contact only a subset of all the venture capitalists that are active at any point in
time. We therefore submit that higher generalized trust increases the probability that a
pair of venture capitalist and entrepreneur generate a match, i.e., that they progress from
the initial state of non-acquainted potential partners all the way to an actual investment.4
There are three possible objections to our hypothesis. The ﬁr s ti st h a tt h e r es h o u l db e
no systematic diﬀerences in how diﬀerent people trust a set of individuals. Indeed, if agents
have common priors and update them based on all the available information, no systematic
diﬀerences should persist at the level of generalized trust, which, by construction, excludes
private information. A problem with this line of argument is that it doesn’t seem to be
supported by the data. In Section 3.4.1 we show that trust diﬀerentials are both pervasive
and remarkably persistent. Moreover, subjective beliefs can be thought of as non-common
priors (Morris (1995)). Their inﬂuence can persist when there is limited information
exchange and limited updating of beliefs. These conditions are likely to hold in illiquid
and opaque markets such as venture capital.5
A second possible objection to our hypothesis is that even if trust diﬀerences persist,
they should not matter, because sophisticated investors can undo them by taking advan-
tage of arbitrage opportunities. This argument seems applicable to liquid and transparent
markets, but is less forceful in venture capital, where arbitrage requires a long horizon.
Moreover, lack of trust can be self-fulﬁlling, i.e., it can be explained by the existence of
multiple equilibria (Greif (1993)). In the low equilibrium arbitrage is infeasible because
the counter-party also has low trust.
A third objection is that the probability that two partners engage in an economic
transaction depends on their social networks, an argument often made by sociologists
(e.g., Granovetter (1995)). In the context of venture capital, it seems plausible that social
networks facilitate the process of search (see Sorenson and Stuart (2001) and Hochberg et
al. (2007)). From an economist’s perspective, a problem with this objection is that social
networks themselves are endogenously formed in a way that reﬂects the patterns of trust
among nations. They can facilitate the matching of entrepreneurs and venture capitalists,
but should not be viewed as the ultimate drivers of this process. We therefore view social
networks not as an alternative hypothesis, but one of the channels through which trust
can aﬀect the formation of venture capital investments.
We also conjecture that the identity of individual decision makers within the venture
capital organization matters for investments. Venture capital is an appropriate context
to put this conjecture to test. This is because the decision to invest is made not by
a single individual but by the whole set of partners in the venture capital ﬁrm, who
have equity in the ﬁrm and meet periodically to make investment decisions (Sahlman
(1990)). Further, we look at whether individual partners’ experience or education aﬀects
investment decisions (see Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hellmann (2008)). We conjecture that
4Nooteboom (2000) notes that in times of radical innovation the importance of tacit knowledge makes
the codiﬁcation needed for enforceable contracts diﬃcult. In venture capital the conditions for trust to
matter are naturally met, as a venture capital investment exposes both parties to outcome uncertainty, and
there are numerous possibilities for opportunistic behavior within a venture capital relationship (Sahlman
(1990)).
5Sociologists frequently argue that in situations wherea g e n t sh a v el i t t l eo b j e c t i v ei n f o r m a t i o n ,s o c i a l
cues (such as generalized trust) become an important basis for decision making (see Podolny (1994)).
6deeper experience (measured by US work experience) or higher educational achievements
could mitigate the eﬀect of trust, since partners with better experience or more education
may become more competent in screening business plans and entrepreneurial teams, and
might therefore be less inﬂuenced by broader societal belief patters such as generalized
trust.
2.3 How does trust aﬀect contracts?
Mainstream contract theory extensively analyzes ﬁnancial contracts (Hart (2001)), but
rarely considers how trust should aﬀect the design of contracts.6 While there has been
virtually no theorizing about generalized trust and contracts, there are two opposite views
of the relationships between personalized trust and contracts.
Greif (1993, 2006), in the context of medieval trading, and McMillan and Woodruﬀ
(2002), in the context of post-socialist economies, suggest that personalized trust and
contractual sophistication are substitutes. Their argument is that long-term relationships
become more important when the legal system makes formal contracting diﬃcult. The
argument for substitutes has also been developed in the management literature, often as
a critique to the assumption of opportunistic behavior in economic transactions used in
Williamson (1985). The substitutes hypothesis assumes that contracts are an eﬀective
safeguard against opportunistic behavior, but that contracts are costly to write and/or
renegotiate. Trust among contracting parties can be a less expensive safeguard against
opportunistic behavior, so that one would expect less detailed contracts when trust is high
(Lane (1998)). In an economics context, Spier (1992) argues that contractual incomplete-
ness can be a signal of the oﬀering party’s unobservable quality. Formal contracts can
then erode personalized trust, and so deter agents from making relation-speciﬁc invest-
ments (see Fehr and Gächter (2002)).
The alternative view is that personalized trust and contractual safeguards are com-
plements. This originates from observing that contracts can be an ineﬀective safeguard
when trust among parties is low (Nooteboom (2002)). Given the costs of contracting, two
parties will only ﬁnd it worthwhile to write a sophisticated contract if they can trust that
each party will abide by it. With low trust the contracting parties prefer to avoid the
cost of writing a sophisticated contract, and the risk of remaining entangled in uncertain
litigation; therefore they use a simpler contract.7
We apply these alternative views to our context, namely the relationship between
generalized trust and contracts. Here the fundamental diﬀerence between the two hy-
potheses is that under the substitutes hypothesis, partners may or may not trust each
other, but they believe that contracts will be enforced. Hence they resort to (costly)
sophisticated contracts only in situations of low trust in their counterpart. Under the
complements hypothesis, however, irrespective of the level of personalized trust among
partners, a suspicion that contractual safeguards will not be enforced (i.e., low generalized
trust) generates a preference for simpler contracts. Hence the main diﬀerence between
6See Casadesus-Masanell (2004), Chen (2000), and Francois and Zabojnik (2005) for some exceptions.
7As suggested by Woolthuis, Hillebrand, and Nooteboom (2002), ’trust may be needed prior to setting
up a contract to ensure that the time and eﬀort invested in the contract, which can be seen as a relation-
speciﬁc investment, is not likely to be wasted.’ Poppo and Zenger (2002) provide evidence from the
outsourcing service industry suggesting that trust and contracts can be complements.
7the substitutes and complements hypotheses concerns the enforceability of contracts. The
substitutes hypothesis assumes that the level of trust is suﬃciently high for the parties to
believe in the validity of contracts, and the need for sophisticated contracts arises when
personalized trust is low. The complements hypothesis, instead, assumes that the beneﬁts
of sophisticated contracts can only be realized in case of high generalized trust, irrespective
of the level of personalized trust.8
What are the contractual dimensions that matter in venture capital? The theoretical
work of Dessein (2005) and Hellmann (2006) explains how simple control structures can
give too much power either to the investor or the entrepreneur, and how control struc-
tures which are contingent on ﬁrm performance can achieve more eﬃcient outcomes. The
empirical work of Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) documents the pervasive use of contin-
gent control rights in US venture capital contracts. The prior literature therefore suggests
that contingent control rights are a useful testing ground for studying the relationships
between trust and contracts. Under the substitutes hypothesis we would expect less con-
tingent contracting in high trust situations, based on the notion that such control rights
are unnecessary due to high trust. Under the complements hypothesis we would expect
more contingent contracting in high trust situation, based on the notion that trust is a
prerequisite for the enforcement of such contracts.
3D a t a a n d v a r i a b l e s
In this section we describe our data sources and motivate our variables, which are deﬁned in
Table 1. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for all dependent and independent variables.
Table 3 reports pairwise correlations among the country-dyadic dependent variables.
3.1 Data sources
Our data comes from a variety of sources. The main data are gathered through a survey of
750 venture capital ﬁrms in 15 European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, and the UK. Venture ﬁrms were included in our sample if they : (i) were full
members of the European Venture Capital Association (EVCA) or of a national venture
capital organization in 2001, (ii) were actively engaged in venture capital and (iii) were
still in operations in 2002. The survey asked detailed information on all ﬁrst rounds of
venture capital investments made between January 1998 and December 2001, as well as
information on the venture ﬁrm’s partners.9 We exclude buyout investments.
8The recent work by Hart and Moore (2008) provides a rationalization of the hypothesis of comple-
mentarity between trust and contracts, even if the authors do not explicitly address the question of trust.
They show that if agents use contracts as reference points for their selﬁsh interests, then simple contracts
have the beneﬁt of creating less mismatch of entitlement feelings, which in their model prevents ex-post
opportunistic behavior. A natural interpretation of their model is to associate mismatched feelings of
entitlement with low trust among partners. It follows that the beneﬁt of simple contracts, in terms of
creating more clarity, is larger in situations of low trust, predicting a positive relationship between trust
and sophisticated contracting.
9We use the term ’ﬁrm’ for the investor (i.e., the venture capital ﬁrm) and the term ’company’ for the
company that receives the venture capital ﬁnancing.
8We received 108 usable responses, which we cross-checked using investor and company
websites, commercial databases (Amadeus, Worldscope, and VenturExpert), and trade
publications. Our data represent a comprehensive cross-section which provides a good
coverage of all countries, with an overall response rate of nearly 16%, a rate signiﬁcantly
larger than for comparable surveys of industrial ﬁrms (see Graham and Harvey (2001)).
No single country dominates the sample, and no country is left out. Our data are not
dominated by a few respondents: the largest venture capital ﬁrm accounts for only 5%
of the observations, and the largest ﬁve for only 16%. Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann
(2008, 2009) provide a more extensive discussion of the data, and report additional tests
that conﬁrm the representativeness of the sample.
The main independent variable is the trust from citizens of one country towards citizens
of another country. This variable is collected by Eurostat through a yearly survey of citi-
zens of all European countries. We report in Table 1 the sources for all other independent
variables.
3.2 Unit of observation
We adopt two units of observation. In the ﬁrst part of the analysis, we focus on the
decision to invest, i.e., whether to make a deal or not. For this we construct the sample
of all potential deals, consisting of every possible pairing between the 108 investors and
their 1,216 portfolio companies. Portfolio companies are located in one of the 15 European
countries venture investors are from; they are also located in Norway, Switzerland, and
the US, since Eurostat collects data on trust in citizens of those countries. The unit of
observation is the individual investor-company pair (as in Sørensen (2007)). For each
company we consider that it could in principle be ﬁnanced by any of the respondent
venture ﬁrms. We take into account that some pairs are not feasible because the venture
capitalist began operations after the date the company was seeking an investment. Our
potential deals dataset includes 107,390 potential deals.
We analyze investment decisions in a discrete choice framework where investors choose
among companies as investment alternatives. In addition to a logit model, we use a con-
ditional logit model where, in the terminology of McFadden (1984), we think of investors
as cases and companies as the alternatives. This approach takes the investors’ perspec-
tive which corresponds to our survey design. In this set-up the trust variable measures
how people from the investor’s country trust people from the company’s country. While
investors chose companies, those companies also choose to accept the investments. We
therefore also estimate our model treating companies as cases and investors as alterna-
tives, in which case the trust variable measures how people from the company’s country
trust people from the investor’s country.
One limitation of our analysis is that to be included in our sample, a company must
have received funding from at least one investor. We clearly cannot observe all the ’mar-
ginal’ companies that never received any funding from any venture capitalist.10 Our analy-
sis therefore examines whether trust aﬀects investment decisions among all ’infra-marginal’
companies, excluding any eﬀect that trust may have on the marginal companies. It is pos-
sible that higher levels of trust increase the size of the venture capital market. Indeed,
10Note that even if we did, their observations would fall out of the regression by the time we consider
the conditional logit model.
9Figure 1 shows a positive correlation of 0.51 (signiﬁcant at the 6% conﬁdence level) be-
tween the size of the venture capital market, measured by aggregate investment (relative
to per-capita GDP), and the level of trust received by each country. Therefore it is likely
that our analysis understates the total eﬀect of trust.
In the second part of the analysis we focus on the eﬀect of trust on venture capital
contracts. For this part of the analysis we use what we call the realized deals sample,
which consists of all the investments that we observe in our data. Our realized deals
sample contains a total of 1,277 deals, into 1,216 companies, made by 108 venture capital
ﬁrms.11
3.3 Dependent variables
In the ﬁrst part of the analysis we ask whether a particular investor ﬁnances a particular
company. The dependent variable is DEAL, which is a dummy variable that takes the
value 1 if the venture capital ﬁrm has invested in a particular company and 0 otherwise.
In the second part of the analysis we address the relation between trust and contracts.
For this we construct ﬁve dependent variables that capture the extent to which sophis-
ticated contracting is used in each deal. We consider four types of contingent control
rights, whereby the investor is allowed to take certain actions in case the company fails to
meet speciﬁed performance targets. We look at the right to take control of the board of
directors, to obtain voting majority, to liquidate the company, and to ﬁre (’terminate’) the
founder/CEO. The correlation coeﬃcients among the contingent control variables ranges
from 0.24 to 0.51. We also build a summary measure of contingent control rights by sum-




Our analysis is based on the Eurobarometer measures of trust, that was previously used
(and described in detail) by Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2009). Eurobarometer is a
large survey about the social and political attitudes of citizens of the European Union
that is executed yearly for the European Commission since 1970. Our trust measure is
derived from the Eurobarometer survey waves from 1990 to 1996.12
How reliable is this measure of trust? First, the trust measure reﬂects patterns one
would intuitively expect: People typically have the highest trust for their own country;
Scandinavian countries receive high trust, and are also more trusting; the British trust
the French less than other nations; and the French are happy to reciprocate. Second,
the Eurobarometer trust measure has a strong correlation with the World Values Survey
(WVS) measure of trust, which has been used by several studies (e.g., Knack and Keefer
11There are more deals than companies because 54 companies receive ﬁnancing from more than one of
our venture investors.
12We do not collect trust data directly from our survey respondents, since such a measure would be
endogenous to their investment experience. The Eurobarometer measure, on the contrary, is clearly ex-
ogenous to the investments made by venture capitalists.
10(1997)). The correlation coeﬃcient is 0.72, signiﬁcant at the 1% level.13 This strong
correlation suggests a reliable measurement of trust that does not depend on the details of
how the surveys were implemented. We also notice that trust among nations is remarkably
persistent over time: The correlation coeﬃcients across Eurobarometer waves is often over
90% and always above 84%.
The remaining country-dyadic variables are meant to capture other factors that should
aﬀect the investment decision, or that constitute potentially alternative explanations. We
employ three variables that are standard controls in the literature on geography and trade:
whether an investor/company pair is either located in the same country, or in neighboring
countries (sharing a common border), and how economically far away are two countries,
using the diﬀerence of the logarithm-transformed per-capita GDP.
We then consider the role of search costs by looking at the amount of information
on each country that is reported in another country’s main business newspaper. We also
consider two country-dyadic variables that capture transaction costs: the similarity of
languages and of legal systems.
To capture taste-based preferences, we build two novel proxy measures. The ﬁrst is the
percentage of nights spent at hotels for holiday purposes by citizens of country i in country
j, averaged over the period from 1998 to 2001. The second is a normalized measure of the
votes from citizens of country i to the song of country j in the Eurovision Song Contest,
averaged over the period from 1993 to 2001. To account for the intensity of economic
relationships between countries we use two standard measures from the trade literature:
the share of exports and of foreign direct investments from country i into country j (in
billions of dollars), averaged over the period from 1998 to 2001.
3.4.2 Other independent variables
Our other independent variables vary at diﬀerent levels. Three variables are measured at
the level of the investor-company pair. First, we compute the log-transformed kilometric
distance between the investor’s and company’s cities using the geodetic formula.14 Second,
we compute two measures to capture an investor’s propensity to make a deal in a company’s
industry and stage of ﬁnancing: the share of investments of a venture capital ﬁrm in the
same industry in which the company operates, and the share of investments of a venture
capital ﬁrm in the same stage at which the company is receiving ﬁnancing.
We consider four company characteristics: its industry of operations, whether the
company seeks early stage (seed or start-up) or late stage (expansion and bridge) ﬁnancing,
and the quality of the company’s legal system, measured by the quality of enforcement
of legal rules described in La Porta et al. (1998), and by the level of the procedural
complexity described in Djankov et al. (2002).
We also include diﬀerent sets of ﬁxed eﬀects: a set of 108 dummy variables, one for
each investor, a set of dummies for investor country, and a set of dummies for company
13The WVS survey question is “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that
you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?” The WVS therefore only measures how trusting citizens
of one country are, rather than bilateral country-dyadic trust. Therefore, we compute the correlation
coeﬃcient using the Eurobarometer trust measure for citizens of the same country.
14Such precision allows us to avoid some of the measurement problems that have plagued the literature
on trade and geography, which typically uses a much coarser measure–the distance between capital cities
(see Head and Mayer (2010)).
11country.
Finally, we use some variables that capture the eﬀect of individual partners within the
venture ﬁrm. First, we consider whether the investor has at least one partner of the same
nationality of a company. Second, we compute the diﬀerence between the average trust
of the investor’s partners in a company’s country citizens and the trust of the investor’s
country in that company’s country. Third, we compute two indicators of the education and
professional experience of a venture ﬁrm’s partners: whether the venture ﬁrm has partners
with US work experience and whether the venture ﬁrm has partners with a doctoral degree.
4 The role of trust for deal formation
4.1 Methodology
W eb e g i nb ya s k i n gw h a tf a c t o r si n ﬂuence a venture capitalist’s decision to invest in
a company. We estimate the probability that a speciﬁc venture capitalist invests in a
speciﬁc company with the following econometric model:




 +  (1)
Let  index investors and  index companies, let  =( ) index investor-company pairs,
and let  index investor-company country dyads. The dependent variable is DEAL, which
is a dummy variable for whether investor  ﬁnances company . The intercept term is
denoted by .T h ev e c t o r0
 represents variables that vary at the country-dyadic level,
namely TRUST, FOREIGN—DEAL, COMMON-BORDER, INFORMATION, GDP—DIFFERENCE,
LANGUAGE-OVERLAP, and LEGAL—DIFFERENCE. The vector 0
 represents vari-
ables that vary at the investor-company pair level, namely DISTANCE, INDUSTRY—FIT
and STAGE—FIT. The vectors 0
 and 0
 represent variables that vary across investors
and companies, respectively; we discuss them below. Since the key independent variables
vary at the level of the country dyad (), we cluster the standard errors of  at the level
of the country dyad. Clustering also implies the use of robust standard errors.
To estimate the probability that a deal occurs, we use a logit model (our results do not
change when we use a probit). To control for investor characteristics we can aﬀord to use a
complete set of investor ﬁxed eﬀects, i.e., 108 dummies. This is clearly the most powerful
way of controlling for any investor-speciﬁce ﬀects, including the investor’s nationality.
The investor ﬁxed eﬀects also take care of any systematic diﬀerences across investors,
including quality and risk aversion. To control for company characteristics, we use STAGE
and INDUSTRY. In addition, we use company country ﬁxed eﬀects. This means that we
control for the overall level of trustworthiness (e.g., on average the Swedes are trusted more
than the Spaniards). As a consequence our trust variables always reﬂect relative trust (e.g.,
relative to the average level of trust, the Spaniards are more trusted by the French than
by the British). Moreover, the company country ﬁxed eﬀects control for any country-
speciﬁce ﬀects, such as investment opportunities, the legal and institutional environment,
and investor friendliness. The coeﬃcient of trust therefore captures how deviations from
the average level of trust towards the company’s country aﬀect the likelihood that an
investor will make a deal with a company located in that country. With over one thousand
companies in our sample we cannot add one ﬁxed eﬀect for every company. However, to
12control even more ﬁnely for company characteristics, we also consider a conditional logit
model. This semi-parametric speciﬁcation eﬀectively includes both investor and company
ﬁxed eﬀects, thus providing the richest possible set of controls.
We want to distinguish trust from home bias. There are many reasons why investors
may prefer to invest in a domestic company (Karolyi and Stulz (2003)). While trust may
be one of those reasons–indeed people tend to express the highest trust for their own
countrymen–we not do want to rely a preference for domestic deals to identify the eﬀect
of trust. We therefore separately control for whether a company is located in the same or
diﬀerent country than the investor, as captured by the FOREIGN-DEAL dummy. Thus
our estimate of the trust eﬀect is conservative, as we eliminate one important channel
through which trust may aﬀect investments.
4.2 Main results
The estimates from the simple and conditional logit models are reported in Table 4. In
column (i) we report the results of the logit estimation without any country-dyadic con-
trols (except those related to geography, namely foreign deal and common border); in
column (ii) we include all the country-dyadic controls. In columns (iii) and (iv) we report
the results from the conditional logit model, ﬁr s tw i t h o u ta n dt h e nw i t hc o u n t r y - d y a d i c
controls.
We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient on TRUST is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level across
all speciﬁcations. This clearly supports the hypothesis that trust aﬀects the likelihood
of making an investment. In addition to being statistically signiﬁcant, the estimated
coeﬃcient measures an economically important eﬀect. We focus on column (ii) in Table
4, which is our main speciﬁcation; results for the other speciﬁcations are very similar. The
logit regression estimates the odds ratio, deﬁned as the ratio of the probability of success to
the probability of failure of the event (in our case of a deal being made). Consider a 1 point
increase in the percentage of people that express high trust. An example (drawn near the
median of the trust distribution) is that 15.3% of Spaniards have high trust for Germans,
and 16.3% of Dutch have high trust for Germans. Such a one percentage point increase
generates a 7.0% increase in the probability of reaching a deal.15 Another approach would
be to consider moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile of the trust distribution. For
example, 10.5% of British people highly trust Germans, which is at the 25th percentile,
while 24.8% of Norwegians highly trust Germans, which is at the 75th percentile. Moving
from the 25th to the 75th percentile of the trust distribution then corresponds to a 105%
increase in probability of reaching a deal–in other words, it more than doubles it.
Table 4 contains several other results. Geographic distance is very important. The
coeﬃcient for DISTANCE has a negative sign and is statistically highly signiﬁcant in all
speciﬁcations. This conﬁrms the notion that venture capital is a highly localized activity.
The coeﬃcient for FOREIGN—DEAL is negative and statistically signiﬁcant in all four
speciﬁcations. The coeﬃcient for COMMON—BORDER is insigniﬁcant. The coeﬃcient
of INFORMATION is positive and statistically highly signiﬁcant. This result suggests
that search costs, broadly deﬁned, matter. The result is even more surprising given the
fact that our measure is only a rough proxy for diﬀerences in the amount of informa-
15At low levels of predicted probability, the marginal increase in probability is very close to the increase
in the odds ratio given by the estimated coeﬃcient.
13tion available to investors. GDP—DIFFERENCE is negative and statistically signiﬁcant,
LANGUAGE—OVERLAP is positive, and LEGAL—DIFFERENCE is negative but never
signiﬁcant. Throughout all regressions we ﬁnd that INDUSTRY—FIT and STAGE—FIT
have a highly signiﬁcant eﬀect, with an (expected) positive sign. This shows that special-
ization is an important aspect of the venture capital market: companies need to ﬁti n t o
investors’ strategic preferences in order to attract investments.
4.3 Trust and individual partners
4.3.1 The role of partner nationality
So far our analysis measures trust using the venture capital ﬁrm’s headquarter location,
ﬁnding that it holds a relevant eﬀect on facilitating ﬁnancial transactions. Our next step
is to ask whether this eﬀect is inﬂuenced by the presence of venture partners of diﬀerent
nationality. Venture capital ﬁrms are typically small partnerships where the decision-
making process is conﬁned within the partners (or senior management in case of bank,
corporate, or public venture ﬁrms). We thus ask whether the individual decision maker’s
trust aﬀects the ﬁrm’s investments.
A useful aspect of our data is that we have information on the nationality of each
venture capital partner. We therefore examine whether having a partner with a certain
nationality changes a venture capital ﬁrm’s likelihood of making an investment. To exam-
ine the importance of partner nationality we look at two possible eﬀects. First, we consider
whether any of the partners of the venture capital ﬁrm have the same nationality as the
company. The hypothesis is that having a partner from the same country of the company
increases the likelihood of investing. For example, since the British have low trust in the
French, we ask whether a British ﬁrm with a French partner is more likely to invest in a
French company than a British ﬁrm without French partners. The PARTNER—MATCH
variable captures this eﬀect.
To further isolate the eﬀect of trust, we also consider a second measure that we call
PARTNER—TRUST. We build it by averaging the trust scores of all of the venture ﬁrm’s
partners, based on their country of birth. We then subtract TRUST from this average.
PARTNER—TRUST measures the diﬀerential trust of the individual venture capitalists
within the ﬁrm. To return to our example, suppose that the British venture capital ﬁrm
had no French partner, but it had an Italian partner. Italians have higher trust for the
French than the British. The PARTNER—TRUST measures this increase in trust. It thus
allows us to examine whether the presence of an Italian partner is associated with a higher
likelihood that the British venture capital ﬁrm makes an investment in the French ﬁrm.
While generalized trust is clearly exogenous to the venture ﬁrm’s investment decisions,
the choice of partners might be endogenous. A venture capital ﬁrm that plans to make
investments in a certain country might hire a partner from that country. Therefore, when
we use these variables we only aim to establish correlation, not causation.
Table 5 reports the results with these two additional variables. For each variable, we
estimate the two speciﬁcations of Table 4 that include all dyadic variables. For space’s
sake we focus on these two speciﬁcations also in the rest of this section; all our results are
qualitatively the same when we omit the country-dyadic variables. The results of table
5 show that the composition of partners inside the venture capital ﬁrm indeed matters
for investment decisions. Columns (i) and (ii) show that PARTNER—MATCH is positive
14and statistically highly signiﬁcant, indicating that the presence of a foreign partner with
the same nationality as the company is associated with a higher likelihood of making
the investment. The presence of a partner from the company’s country corresponds to a
7% higher odds ratio. Columns (iii) and (iv) shows that the same holds for PARTNER—
TRUST. Here as well we ﬁnd a positive and statistically highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient,
suggesting that the national composition of partners is associated with a higher likelihood
of a deal. The economic eﬀect of PARTNER—TRUST is also sizeable. An increase of
one percentage point in PARTNERS—TRUST corresponds to an odds ratio that is about
8.8% higher, depending on the model. We also notice that the statistical and economic
signiﬁcance of the main trust variable is barely aﬀected by the inclusion of these additional
partner measures.
4.3.2 The role of education and experience
The detail of our data on individual partners allows us to gain additional insights on how
other partner characteristics aﬀect the role of trust. One might argue that the role of trust
should disappear when investors are suﬃciently sophisticated. To test this conjecture, we
exploit diﬀerences among individual partners to examine whether their experience or ed-
ucation achievements aﬀect the inﬂuence of trust on deal formation. Since our empirical
model relies on the use of investor ﬁxed eﬀect, we cannot just include measures of experi-
ence or education. Instead, we use interactions between trust and such measures to tease
out the diﬀerential trust eﬀect.
Prior work by Kaplan, Martell and Strömberg (2007) suggests that having work ex-
perience in the US exposes European venture partners to best management practice, and
to a culture of entrepreneurship that could facilitate the evaluation of business projects.
In addition, we conjecture that obtaining a PhD as the highest educational achievement
might be correlated with sophisticated reasoning. Table 6 reports the results of two sets
of regressions, one for US experience and one for PhD education. For brevity’s sake, we
only report the coeﬃcient for trust, interacted with a dummy for each of the two vari-
ables. The results show that US experience and PhD education reduce the eﬀect of trust
in a statistically signiﬁcant manner. At the same time this reduction leaves a strong and
signiﬁcant trust eﬀect even for the most experienced and educated partners.
These results give us additional insights into the importance of trust for investment.
T h ef a c tt h a tw ec o n t i n u et oﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect of trust when looking at variation
across partners within ﬁrms provides evidence that trust operates at the level of individual
decision makers. Moreover, the fact that experience and education reduce the inﬂuence
of trust but do not wipe it out, suggests that trust has an eﬀect even when decision are
made by sophisticated professional investors.
4.4 Alternative measures of trust
Since our trust variable measures the trust of an average citizen, a potential concern is
that it doesn’t reﬂect the beliefs of venture capitalists. That is, the average citizen’s trust
may not apply to the socio-economic group venture capitalists belong to.16 We therefore
16For example, while it may be true that the French hardly enjoy a high level of trust in the pubs of
East London, what we care about is what trust they enjoy in the wine bars of the City of London.
15recalculate our measure of trust for a subset of the population that is likely to correspond
to the average venture capitalist. Since the Eurobarometer includes some information
on the socioeconomic characteristics of respondents, we restrict our attention to those
whose proﬁle broadly corresponds to that of professionals. More precisely, we consider
respondents who are in the upper half of the income distribution, were at least 20 years
old when ﬁnishing their last studies (implying they have at least a bachelor degree), and
are between 34 and 50 years old–an interval that covers one standard deviation above and
below the mean age of the venture partners in our sample. We ﬁnd that this additional
measure of the trust variable is highly correlated with the main measure of trust (the
correlation coeﬃcient is 0.99), suggesting that diﬀerences in the socioeconomic group have
little eﬀect on trust. When we use this additional measure, the results, for both trust and
the other variables, remain unaﬀected.
Our analysis so far focuses on the trust of the investor’s country in the company’s
country. This reﬂects the notion that investors are those who decide whether to make a
deal or not. However, entrepreneurs have to accept their investors, too. We then consider
trust also from the company’s perspective. These two measures contain strong elements
of reciprocity and are highly correlated. Including both measures in the same regression
would thus be meaningless. Instead, we re-estimate our regressions substituting ’investor’
trust with ’company’ trust. The information variable is our only other asymmetric variable,
so we also rebuild it from the company’s perspective. All of our results remain qualitatively
intact when we adopt the company’s perspective.17
4.5 Alternative explanations
A challenge for the entire research on trust is to what extent one can distinguish the eﬀect
of trust from other explanations. The base model, beyond using investor and company
country ﬁxed eﬀects, already controls for three important alternative explanations. First,
we control for geographic factors: the distance between each individual investor and each
individual company, whether a deal is domestic, the existence of common borders, and the
diﬀerence in GDP per capita. Second, we control for search costs, with the information
variable. Third, we control for transactions costs, since language overlap and commonality
of legal systems are likely to aﬀect the costs of closing a deal. We now look at other
potential explanations.
There is a long tradition in economics of distinguishing beliefs from preferences, dating
back at least to the seminal work of Becker (1957) and Arrow (1973). In our context, our
concern is to ensure that our result on trust is not driven by investor’s tastes. We need
to distinguish how much investors ‘trust’ other countries, based on beliefs, and how much
investors ’like’ other countries, based on taste. Liking is a subjective concept that is
diﬃcult to measure, so we consider two diﬀerent proxies. First, we use relative tourism
ﬂows, since tourism ﬂows reﬂect taste-based preferences among nations. This is admittedly
a noisy measure, but it has the advantage of being a bilateral measure. Moreover, the
company country ﬁxed eﬀects remove any common factors that aﬀect tourism (e.g., the
fact that Italy has more tourist attractions than Denmark). Second, we exploit data
17Since both parties have to agree to the deal, it may be that what matters is the lower (or possibly
higher) of the two trust levels. We re-estimated all of our regressions using the lower (and also the higher)
between ’investor’ and ’company’ trust, ﬁnding again that all our results continue to hold.
16from the Eurovision Song Contest, a popular and uniquely European event, to construct
a measure of taste-based preferences that varies within country pairs. Eurovision is an
annual televised music contest among European countries, where each country is allowed to
send one candidate. Viewers from around Europe rank the contestants from other countries
on a scale from 0 to 12. While the absolute ranking presumably depends on contestants’
quality, prior research has argued that the relative vote ranking reﬂect patterns of how
much people from one European country like others (Clerides and Stengos (2006), Fenn
et al. (2006)). As in Felbermayr and Toubal (2007), we control for song quality through a
comprehensive set of song-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects.
Columns (i) to (iv) of Table 7 report the results of adding the TOURISM and EU-
ROVISION taste proxies to our logit and conditional speciﬁcations with dyadic variables.
We ﬁnd that the eﬀect of trust is not aﬀected by their inclusion, both in statistical and
economic terms. The tourism variable has a negative and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect.
The Eurovision variable is statistically not signiﬁcant. Thus our main results about trust
do not appear to be driven by taste-based preferences.
Another question is to what extent the relationship between trust and venture invest-
ments diﬀers from the relationship between trust and trade, identiﬁed by Guiso, Sapienza
and Zingales (2009). To examine this we include measures of trade or foreign direct invest-
ments (FDI) as additional controls. One reason for doing this is that existing patterns of
trade may facilitate venture investments. Another reason is to test whether trust matters
more for venture investment than for general trade ﬂows. However, there is also one reason
not to include trade. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2009) establish a positive relationship
between trust and aggregate trade ﬂows. Including trade in our equation therefore intro-
duces multicollinearity, i.e., the model may be over-speciﬁed. With this caveat, columns
(v) and (viii) of Table 7 report the results of adding EXPORTS and FDI to to our logit
and conditional speciﬁcations with dyadic variables. As expected, we ﬁnd that both EX-
PORTS and FDI are positive and statistically signiﬁcant. However, their inclusion does
not aﬀect the signiﬁcance and magnitude of the trust variable. This suggests that, even
after possibly over-specifying the model, we continue to ﬁnd that trust matters. In fact,
the evidence suggests that trust matters more for venture capital investment than for
aggregate trade and FDI ﬂows.
4.6 Foreign subsamples
The Eurobarometer data contains a bilateral measure of trust not only for the foreign
countries but also for the domestic country. Unlike Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2009)
who focus on exports and FDI, we can make use of the domestic trust data. Our regres-
sions already include a control dummy for whether the investor and company are from
the same country or not. To make our results more comparable to the prior literature,
we performed some additional analysis on foreign subsamples. There are multiple possible
ways of deﬁning such subsamples. We focus on two deﬁnitions that we call the broad
and the narrow foreign subsample. The ’broad’ foreign subsample excludes investors that
only invest domestically. It consists of 49 investors and 1,216 companies. This gives us
a subsample where each company is fundable by all its domestic VCs and by those for-
eign venture ﬁrms that invest abroad; it therefore contains some (potential and realized)
17domestic deals–those by venture ﬁrms that invest beyond their home country.18 The
’narrow’ foreign subsample excludes all domestic deals, potential or realized. It only in-
cludes venture ﬁrms that invest abroad, and those companies that have at least one foreign
investor. It consists of 49 investors and 223 companies. The narrow sample most resembles
the prior literature, but also has several disadvantages. It throws away a lot of relevant
information, thus reducing our statistical power, and it alters the economic interpretation
of the logit model which now estimates choices from an artiﬁcially constrained choice set.
In Table 8 we report results corresponding to the logit and conditional logit speciﬁca-
tions with dyadic variables of Table 4. Columns (i) and (ii) show the results for the logit
and conditional logit model for the broad foreign subsample, which excludes all venture
capital ﬁrms that only invest domestically. Columns (iii) and (iv) show the results for the
narrow foreign subsample, which includes only those potential deals that involve a foreign
investment. The coeﬃcients of trust retain their size and signiﬁcance across all of these
speciﬁcations.19
4.7 Further robustness
In deﬁning the sample of potential deals, we deliberately refrain from imposing restrictions
on the set of admissible potential deals, other than requiring that the venture capital ﬁrm
was in existence at the time that the company was seeking funding. This means that we
let the econometric model determine what matches are more or less likely. An alternative
approach is to impose additional restrictions on the set of admissible potential deals,
making assumptions about which pairs have a zero probability of resulting in a deal.
While we prefer not to make such assumptions in the main model, we now impose some
additional restrictions to ensure that our results are not driven by our sample construction
criteria.
We observe that some venture capital ﬁrms in our sample never invest in certain sectors,
or never invest in companies at certain stages of development. We therefore exclude the
potential deals where the investor never invests in a company’s sector or stage. We ﬁnd
that our results are unaﬀected by this restriction.20
Our data contains investors from 15 countries but companies from 18 countries. To
make sure that the inclusion of the three non-EU countries (Norway, Switzerland, and
the US) does not aﬀect any of the results, we rerun all of our regressions eliminating the
companies from these countries. We ﬁnd that this does not aﬀect any of our results.
The construction of our sample involves multiple observations for the same company.
One concern is the standard independence assumption of the logit model may be violated
in this context.21 We therefore estimate the logit regressions clustering standard errors by
18None of our results change if we also drop from the set of the potential matches the 512 companies
that are ﬁnanced by venture ﬁrms that invest only domestically.
19The eﬀects of the control variables are largely similar to those they have the full sample, except for
FOREIGN—DEAL, which becomes insigniﬁcant in the broad foreign subsample. This suggests that the
negative eﬀect in the main sample is largely driven by domestic investors. Put diﬀerently, among the
purely international investors we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant home bias. FOREIGN—DEAL is not included in the
narrow foreign subsample, which by construction contains only foreign deals.
20We also combine these two restrictions with excluding potential deals where the investor never invests
abroad, and again ﬁnd that our results are not aﬀected.
21This is not an issue for the conditional logit model, which directly accounts for the interdependence of
18company instead of country-dyad, and ﬁnd that this does not reduce statistical signiﬁcance
levels. We also consider two-dimensional clustering, by company and investor, as suggested
by Thompson (2006). We ﬁnd again that this does not reduce the sign or statistical
signiﬁcance levels of any coeﬃcient.
A few companies in our sample make multiple deals with diﬀerent investors. Instead
of conditioning the conditional logit model on individual companies, we can condition on
individual deals. This even more ﬁne-grained approach does not aﬀect any of our results.
Our unit of analysis is the potential deal, but our key dependent variable, TRUST,
varies at a higher level of aggregation, namely the country-dyad. Our base speciﬁcation
thus clusters by country-dyads. As an additional robustness check we aggregate the data
to the level of the country-dyads. This involves a considerable loss of information, since
we have to discard most of the micro-level information. Still, we consider a Poisson
model where the dependent variable is the number of deals in each country dyad, and the
independent variables are just the country-dyad controls. We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient on
trust continues to be statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level; using a negative binomial
model yields similar results. This suggests that our key results hold irrespective of the
unit of analysis used.
Some venture capital ﬁrms have multiple oﬃces (Chen et el. (2010)). This aﬀects
our measure of eﬀective distance from the companies. We therefore compute the minimal
distance between each company and all (potential and actual) investors. We ﬁnd that
none of our results are aﬀected.
The investment decision of a venture capital ﬁrm can respond to market conditions,
in particular the number of entrepreneurs seeking funding. We conjecture that a ﬁrm
receiving a high number of funding requests can aﬀord to be pickier, i.e., such a ﬁrm is
less likely to invest in any one company. In the short run, a venture capital ﬁrm’s fund
size is ﬁxed (Sahlman (1990)), so that a higher solicitation rate makes it harder for any
one company to receive funding from that venture ﬁrm. Cassiman and Ueda (2006) derive
such a prediction in a model where the investor considers the option value of waiting.
Our survey obtained information on how many business plans an investor has received
each year. From this we construct a time-varying measure of the number of entrepreneurs
soliciting funding from a speciﬁc venture capital ﬁrm (‘solicitation rate’). When we include
this variable in our main model, we ﬁnd that its coeﬃcient is always negative and largely
signiﬁcant. Moreover, our results for trust are conﬁrmed.22
The prior social capital literature argues that trust among nations is related to the
history of wars, to religious similarities, and even to genetic similarities (Guiso, Sapienza
and Zingales (2009)). These variables have no obvious connection to venture capital
investments, and their inclusion comes at the risk of over-specifying the model because
they have been shown to be correlated with trust. Still, we conﬁrm that the main eﬀect
of trust continues to hold even after controlling for these additional factors.
The venture capital industry is highly cyclical. Our data covers the period 1998-2001,
so that the early sample comes from an upward cycle and the latter part from a down cycle.
One may ask whether the eﬀect of trust is stronger in boom or bust periods. To address
this, we interact the trust variable with two dummies, one for the boom period (1998-
observations within groups.
22The only exception is that trust becomes marginally signiﬁcant, with a p-value of 0.14, in the condi-
tional (but not the ordinary) logit speciﬁcation, and only in the broad foreign sample.
191999) and one for the bust period (2000-2001). In unreported regressions, we ﬁnd that
both coeﬃcients continue to be positive and statistically signiﬁcant. The boom coeﬃcient
is larger than the bust coeﬃcient, but their diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant.
Finally, in case one still worries that there remain any unobserved peculiarities in our
data that drive the results, we construct a falsiﬁcation exercise. Instead of giving each
investor and company its true country identity, we randomly assign a ’false’ country iden-
tity. Based on these false identities, we also recalculate all the country-dyadic variables.
The coeﬃcient of TRUST in our main regressions becomes utterly insigniﬁcant, providing
further reassurance that our main result is not an artifact of the sample, but reﬂects a
real and robust economic phenomenon.
5 The role of trust for contracts
5.1 Methodology
The results from the previous section raise the question of whether contracts can overcome
a lack of trust. In Section 2.3 we derived two competing hypotheses about the relationship
between trust and contracts that we labeled the substitutes and complements hypotheses.
Under the substitutes hypothesis investors require sophisticated contracts to compensate
for a lack of trust. They believe that contracts are enforceable, but only incur the costs
of writing sophisticated contracts when they perceive a need for it, namely when there is
insuﬃcient trust. Under the complements hypothesis, by contrast, investors question the
enforceability of sophisticated contract. They are willing to incur the costs of writing a
sophisticated contract only when they trust a nation, including its culture and institutions.
Our unit of analysis is the sample of realized deals. We examine four contingent control
rights, pertaining to the composition of the board of directors, the allocation of voting
rights, the decision to liquidate the company’s assets, and the ability to terminate the
founders’ employment contract. These control rights all address major areas of potential
conﬂict between investors and entrepreneurs (Sahlman (1990)). Contingent control rights
are measured with dummy variables, so that we use a logit model (using a probit model
does not change our results). We also create an index which counts the number of control
rights used, for which we use a Poisson model. Formally, our econometric speciﬁcation is
given by:




 +  (2)
where  =( ) indexes the realized investor-company pairs. The dependent variables are
CONTINGENT—RIGHTS—BOARD, CONTINGENT—RIGHTS—VOTING, CONTINGENT—
RIGHTS—LIQUIDATION, and CONTINGENT—RIGHTS—TERMINATION, and their sum-
mary index, CONTINGENT—RIGHTS—INDEX. The  vectors represent the same vari-
ables as in equation (1), with one notable exception. Because the sample of realized deals is
much smaller, adding investor ﬁxed eﬀe c tw o u l do v e r - s p e c i f yt h em o d e l .W et h e r e f o r eu s e
a set of four control variables: INDEPENDENT—VC, VC—AGE, VC—SIZE, and investor
country ﬁxed eﬀects.
205.2 Estimation results
Table 9 reports our ﬁndings. Each column represents a diﬀerent dependent variable. The
coeﬃcient of TRUST is always positive and statistically highly signiﬁcant in four out of
ﬁve dependent variables, the exception being CONTINGENT—RIGHTS—BOARD. This
result is not consistent with the ‘substitutes’ hypothesis, where contingent contracts are
used to address lack of trust. Instead, it is consistent with the ‘complements’ hypothesis,
where trust is a prerequisite for sophisticated contracting. This is a new and intriguing
result.
To interpret the positive coeﬃcient of trust on contractual sophistication, it is impor-
tant to remember that we are measuring generalized trust, not personalized trust. Low
trust does not mean that the investors distrust individual entrepreneurs–after all they
are making an investment. Instead, what is driving the complements hypothesis is that
with low generalized trust investors forgo sophisticated contracts, because they question
the enforceability of these contracts in the ﬁrst place.
Using this insight, we devise an additional test of the complements hypothesis that
uses a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach to examine how the relationship between trust
and contingent contracts depends on legal enforcement. The regressions in Table 9 use
company country ﬁxed eﬀects, thereby controlling (among other things) for diﬀerences
in the company country’s enforcement regime. We now investigate whether the eﬀect of
trust on contracting varies according to the strength of legal enforcement. We divide our
sample into (company) countries with low versus high quality of contract legal enforcement
using the rule of law index of La Porta et al. (1998) and the procedural complexity
index of Djankov et al. (2002). Both of these indices have been extensively used in
the literature to measure the quality of legal contract enforcement. The complements
hypothesis emphasizes that before investors consider writing sophisticated contracts, they
must ﬁrst have a general conﬁdence in their enforcement. We would therefore expect
that the positive eﬀect of trust is strongest in countries with higher standards of legal
enforcement.23 By contrast, the substitutes hypothesis posits that contingent contracts
compensate for the lack of trust. We would therefore expect that the negative eﬀect of
trust is more pronounced in countries with low standards of legal enforcement, i.e., that
the substitution eﬀect is stronger when there is more to compensate for.
Table 10 reports the results of regressions equivalent of those reported in Table 9; in
Panel A we interact trust with the rule of law index, and in Panel B with the index of
procedural complexity. Consistent with the complements hypothesis, we ﬁnd that trust has
a stronger positive eﬀect on contingent contracts in countries with better legal enforcement.
With weaker legal enforcement, however, the eﬀect of trust is often not even signiﬁcant.
These ﬁndings further reinforce the complements hypothesis.
23This formulation is also consistent with Gennaioli (2009), who develops a model in which judicial bias
reduces the extent to which agents choose contingent contracts. The underlying idea is that the quality of
the legal system aﬀects uncertainty about enforcement. In his setting, the procedures and disclosures rules
characterizing Common Law systems can reduce the ability of judges to base their decisions on ambiguous
factors. This reduces the importance of judicial bias and fosters the adoption of contingent contracts.
215.3 Endogenous selection
Our interpretation of the main trust coeﬃcient is based on examining variations in trust
across a set of investments that are assumed to be otherwise comparable. Our ﬁned-
grained control variables give us some conﬁdence in the assumption that those deals can
be compared in terms of their observable characteristics. The question remains whether
our results could be driven by selection on unobservables. For example, it could be that
the only investments that are made in low trust situations are simpler, less risky deals
that require fewer contingent control rights. Since we cannot observe the business nature
of a deal, we could incorrectly attribute to trust what is in eﬀect due to an (unobservable)
selection eﬀect.
To address concerns about selection on unobservables, we estimate a Heckman selection
model. The selection equation is given by equation (1) and the outcome equation by
equation (2). We explore two approaches and point out strengths and weaknesses of
both. The fact that our results remain robust across both approaches provides at least
some assurance that they are not driven by selection eﬀects. Wooldridge (2002, ch. 17.4)
provides a discussion of the merits and limits of either approach.
Our ﬁrst approach uses the main speciﬁcations of the selection and outcome equations
reported in Tables 4 and 8. Identiﬁcation depends on the normality assumption and on
the fact that the selection equation has more controls, because it uses investor ﬁxed eﬀects
instead of the investor-country ﬁxed eﬀect used in the outcome equation. The strength of
this approach is that no additional assumptions are made relative to the base model. The
weakness is that the identiﬁcation is driven by the econometric speciﬁcation, rather than
an economic exclusion restriction.
Our second approach addresses this weakness by augmenting the selection equation
with variables that aﬀect the selection equation, but that can reasonably be excluded
from the outcome equation. Obviously one can always argue that any variable that aﬀects
deal formation also aﬀects contracting. Our plausibility argument therefore relies on an
interpretation that these variables, while demonstrably important for deal formation, are
unlikely to still matter by the time that the entrepreneur and venture capitalist negotiate
contractual terms.
We propose three identifying variables. The ﬁrst two are EXPORTS and FDI. A
high level of exports and FDI means that two countries are likely to have well-established
networks for facilitating cross-country commercial transactions. Rauch (2001) suggest
that trade ﬂows are related to interpersonal networks. We argue that the presence of
these cross-country institutional links facilitate the search process between entrepreneurs
and investors. At the time of contracting, however, it is reasonable to assume that these
trade-related institutional links no longer play an important role, i.e., they don’t aﬀect
the kind of contracts entrepreneurs and investors agree upon. In Section 4.5 we noted
that trade-related variables could over-specify the model, because EXPORTS and FDI
are correlated with trust. Their inclusion could thus interfere with the coeﬃcient estimate
of trust in the selection equation. In the Heckman model this is less of a concern, since
the main focus is the estimation of the trust coeﬃcient in the outcome equation.
Our third identifying variable (SOLICITATION) measures the likelihood that a par-
ticular investor invests in a particular company in a particular year. In Section 4.7 we
already showed that investment decisions depend on the number of entrepreneurs seeking
22fund (the ’solicitation rate’). We now argue that while SOLICITATION matters in the
selection equation, it is reasonable to exclude it from the outcome regression. This is
because it seems unlikely that the details of the contract depend on the number of other
entrepreneurs seeking funding.
Because of the large number of observations (over 100,000 in the selection equation) and
control variables (including over 100 dummy variables), we can only achieve convergence
in STATA by using the linear probability model (heckman instead of heckprob), and
the two-step estimation procedure (which still achieves consistent estimates). Table 11
reports the results of the two Heckman selection models. Panel A reports results for the
base model, and Panel B for the augmented model. For brevity, each Panel reports only
the coeﬃcient or TRUST in the selection equation of the base model, and the coeﬃcient
or TRUST and those of FDI, EXPORT, and SOLICITATION in the selection equation of
the augmented model.
Table 11 shows that the coeﬃcient of TRUST remains positive and statistically sig-
niﬁcant in both the base and augmented models. This is true for all equations (except
for BOARD), suggesting that our previous ﬁndings are not aﬀected by unobservable se-
lection issues. We also ﬁnd that the three identifying variables in the augmented model
are highly signiﬁcant and have the expected sign, i.e., higher exports and FDI increases
the probability of a company being selected, whereas a higher solicitation rate decreases
that probability. The estimates of Mills’  are positive and signiﬁcant in four out of ten
equations (and insigniﬁcant in the others), suggesting that unobservable selection eﬀects
may aﬀect contingent control rights, but that this is not a very strong eﬀect. However,
when selection occurs, it does not seem to interfere with the main eﬀect of trust on con-
tracting. For all augmented models we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient estimates of all three
excluded variables are statistically highly signiﬁcant. Following Stock, Wright, and Yogo
(2002), we also test the joint signiﬁcance of our three instruments using the ﬁrst-stage
F-statistic. We ﬁnd that the test exceeds the 5% critical value, supporting the relevance
of our instruments. We also use all combinations of one or two of our excluded variables,
and ﬁnd that all the results remain valid.
5.4 Further robustness
In unreported regressions we perform further robustness checks for the realized deals sam-
ple. Similar to sections 4.4 to 4.7, we employ the socioeconomic measure of trust and
the measure of trust from the company perspective. We add as regressors tourism, FDI,
exports, and the Eurovision Song Contest measure; and we cluster standard errors at the
investor instead of country-dyad level. We also use the minimal distance between each
company and its investors to account for investments made by venture ﬁrms with multiple
oﬃces In all these cases we ﬁnd that none of our results are aﬀected.
Our main ﬁndings continue to hold in all of these cases. We also use, as an index to
measure the quality of the legal system, the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) developed
by Transparency International (www.transparency.org) in place of the rule of law and
procedural complexity indices of Table 10. The CPI provides a measure of the institutional
quality of a country, which could aﬀect parties’ willingness to adopt contingent contracts.
The results remain fully consistent with those of Table 10.
Finally we check that the results for contracts do not depend on any single country, or
23on the inclusion of deals with companies located in non-EU countries. We ﬁnd that the
trust coeﬃcient is positive and statistically signiﬁcant in most speciﬁcations, insigniﬁcant
in very few speciﬁcations, and never negative and signiﬁcant. In addition, building on
our prior work (Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann (2008, 2009)), we introduce controls for
whether deals were syndicated, and whether the venture capital ﬁrm was the lead investor.
Trust does not seem to explain the use of contingent liquidation rights but all other results
remain unaﬀected.
6C o n c l u s i o n
Economists often distrust explanations that rely on subjective beliefs. Trust is a subjective
belief, but so is economists’ distrust of trust-based explanations. Hence the importance of
empirically demonstrating the eﬀect of trust.
No single paper can deﬁnitively establish the full economic importance of trust. The
approach we take in this paper is to examine the eﬀect of trust in a tightly deﬁned envi-
ronment, venture capital, where we can obtain micro level data. This has the advantage
that we can safely dismiss concerns about reverse causality, and that we can control for
a large number of alternative explanations. We ﬁnd that trust has a signiﬁcant eﬀect
on the investment decisions of venture capital ﬁrms, even after controlling for a host of
other variables, including geographic controls, diﬀerences in information, languages and
legal systems, and taste-based preferences. This holds even when we control for investor
ﬁxed eﬀects and company country ﬁxed eﬀects, which accounts for any unobserved factors
like the quality of national institutions, the ability, risk tolerance, and preferences of indi-
vidual investors and the sectoral specialization of individual countries. We also ﬁnd that
the national composition of the venture partners who decide on an investment matters.
Finally, we uncover evidence that the eﬀect of trust extends beyond investment decisions
and extends to how ﬁnancial contracts are structured.
Our paper opens up further lines of research. For example, our results on the com-
position of partners inside a ﬁrm points to the importance of examining under which
circumstances trust matters more (or less) for investment, and how the presence of het-
erogeneous agents can aﬀect trust in teams. Another open question is the eﬀect of trust
on ﬁnancial contracts. Our analysis is the ﬁrst to tackle this issue, and suggests that trust
and contractual sophistication are complements, not substitutes. Future research should
examine in a more comprehensive manner how contracts are aﬀected by trust.
The analysis also suggests some policy conclusion. Governments across the globe are
seeking to attract venture capitalists to invest in their countries (Bottazzi and Da Rin
(2002), Da Rin, Nicodano, and Sembenelli (2006)). Our results suggest that investments
ought to be expected mostly from countries with well established trust for the recipient
country. This provides some guidance as to what countries might be the most promising
targets for government that want to attract foreign venture capital investments.
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29T a b l e1 :V a r i a b l ed e ﬁnitions
Table 1(a): Dependent variables
Deal is measured at the potential deal level, the control rights variables at the (realized) deal level.
Variable Description
DEAL dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the venture capital ﬁrm
has invested in a particular company; 0 otherwise. We obtain the
data from our survey instrument, which asked venture ﬁrms to
list all their portfolio companies.
CONTINGENT RIGHTS: BOARD dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the venture capital ﬁrm
r e p o r t st oh a v ei n c l u d e dc o n t i n g e n tb o a r dr i g h t si nt h es p e c i ﬁc
deal. We obtain the data from our survey instrument, which
asked: Does your ﬁrm has a right to obtain control of the board of
directors contingent on the realization of certain events? Possible
answers were: Yes, No.
CONTINGENT RIGHTS: VOTING dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the venture capital ﬁrm
reports to have included contingent voting rights in the speciﬁc
deal. We obtain the data from our survey instrument, which
asked: Does your ﬁrm has a right to obtain voting rights contin-
gent on the realization of certain events? Possible answers were:
Yes, No.
CONTINGENT RIGHTS: LIQUIDATION dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the venture capital ﬁrm
reports to have included contingent liquidation rights in the spe-
ciﬁc deal. We obtain the data from our survey instrument, which
asked: Does your ﬁrm has a right to liquidate the company contin-
gent on the realization of certain events? Possible answers were:
Yes, No.
CONTINGENT RIGHTS: TERMINATION dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the venture capital ﬁrm
reports to have included contingent termination rights in the spe-
ciﬁc deal. We obtain the data from our survey instrument, which
asked: Does your ﬁrm has a right to ﬁre the founder/CEO contin-
gent on the realization of certain events? Possible answers were:
Yes, No.
CONTINGENT RIGHTS: INDEX index measure of contingent control rights obtained from summing
over the four contingent control dummies. This variable takes a
value between 0 and 4.Table 1(b): Independent variables: Country-dyadic level
Country-dyadic variables are measured at the level of the investor country and company country pair.
Variable Description
TRUST percentage of the citizens in one contry that trust a lot people from the other country.
It is obtained from the Eurostat’s Eurobarometer question: " Iw o u l dl i k et oa s ky o u
a question about how much trust you have in people from various countries. For each,
please tell me whether you have a lot of trust, some trust, not very much trust or no trust
at all." The answers range from 1 (no trust at all) to 4 (a lot of trust). Our measure is
the percentage of individuals who respond 4.
FOREIGN DEAL dummy variable that takes value 1 if the investor and company are from diﬀerent coun-
tries; 0 otherwise.
COMMON BORDER dummy variable that takes value 1 if the investor’s and company’s countries share a land
border; 0 otherwise (including domestic deals).
GDP DIFFERENCE diﬀerence (for each country pair) of the log-transformed per capita GDP, expressed in
euros and averaged over the 1998—2001 period. This variable is obtained from Datas-
tream.
INFORMATION percentage of times a country is mentioned in the other country’s main business news-
paper over the 1998-2001 period, obtained from the Factiva database. For each country
dyad, we record the number of articles in the main business newspaper of country i that
mention in the headlines country j,o rc i t i z e n so fc o u n t r yj.W e d i v i d e t h i s n u m b e r b y
the total number of articles in the newspaper that are related to all the countries in our
sample. We set INFORMATION equal to zero for domestic deals (i=j).
LANGUAGE OVERLAP percentage of people who speak the same language in each country dyad. This variable
is set to 1 for domestic deals. The data is obtained from www.ethnologue.com.
LEGAL DIFFERENCE dummy variable that takes value 1 if investor and company are located in countries with
diﬀerent legal origins; 0 otherwise. We distinguish between Common law, French-origin
civil law, German-origin civil law, and Scandinavian-origin civil law. The data is obtained
from Laporta et al. (1998).
TOURISM percentage of the nights spent for holiday purposes by citizens of country i at hotels in
country j, out of the total holiday nights spent in the sample countries, averaged over
the period from 1998 to 2001. This variable is set to 0 for domestic deals. The data is
obtained from Eurostat.
EUROVISION Normalized score of the votes from citizens of country i to the song of country j in the
Eurovision Song Contest, computed as in Felbermayr and Toubal (2007), averaged over
the period from 1993 to 2001. The data is obtained from the www.eurovision.tv website.
EXPORTS percentage of the exports from country i to country j, out of the total export towards
the sample countries, averaged over the period from 1998 to 2001. This variable is set to
0 for domestic deals. The data is obtained from the UN World Trade database.
FDI percentage of the foreign direct investments from country i to country j out of the
total FDI towards the sample countries, averaged over the period from 1998 to 2001.
This variable is set to 0 for domestic deals. The data is obtained form OECD’s Main
Economic Indicators database.Table 1(c): Other independent variables
Distance, Industry Fit, and Stage Fit are measured at the investor-company pair level. ALl other variables are
measured at the company level.
Variable Description
DISTANCE natural logarithm of one plus the kilometric distance between the venture capital
investor and the company. The distance is computed by applying the geodetic for-
mula to the longitudinal and latitudinal coordinates of each investor and company
pair. This data is obtained from www.multimap.com.
INDUSTRY set of dummy variables for each company’s industry. We obtain the data from our
survey instrument, which gave the following choices: Biotech and pharmaceuticals;
Medical products; Software and internet; Financial services; Industrial services;
Electronics; Consumer services; Telecommunications; Food and consumer goods;
Industrial products (including energy); Media & Entertainment; Other.
EARLY STAGE dummy variable that takes value 1 if the company raised seed or start-up ﬁnance; 0
otherwise. We obtain the data from our survey instrument, which asked: Indicate
the type of your ﬁrst round of ﬁnancing to this company. Possible answers were:
Seed; Start-up; Expansion; Bridge.
INDUSTRY FIT percentage of the deals made by the venture capital investor in the same industry
of the company.
STAGE FIT percentage of the deals made by the venture capital investor in the same stage at
which the company gets ﬁnanced.
SOLICITATION Number of business plans received by each venture capital ﬁrm in each year be-
tween 1998 and 2001.
HIGH—RULE (LOW) dummy variable that takes value 1 (or 0) if the company’s legal system is above
(below) the median level of the rule of law index from La Porta et al. (1998).
HIGH—PROCEDURAL (LOW) dummy variable that takes value 1 (or 0) if the company’s legal system is above
(below) the median level of the procedural complexity index from Djankov et al.
(2002). We rescale the index so that higher values correspond to a less formal legal
system.
INVESTOR F.E. set of 108 dummy variables, one for each investor.
COMPANY F.E. set of 1,216 dummy variables, one for each company.
INDEPENDENT—VC dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the venture capitalist deﬁn e si t s e l fa sa n
independent venture ﬁrm; 0 otherwise
VC—SIZE natural logarithm of one plus the amount under management of the venture capital
ﬁrm at the end of the sample period, in millions of current euros.
VC—AGE. natural logarithm of one plus the age of the venture capital ﬁrm, measured in
months at the end of the sample period.
INVESTOR—COUNTRY F.E. set of investor country dummy variables.
COMPANY—COUNTRY F.E. set of company country dummy variables.Table 1(d): Independent variables: Individual partner characteristics
Venture partner variables are measured at the level of the venture capital investor.
Variable Description
PARTNER—MATCH dummy variable that takes value 1 if the investor has at
least one partner of the same nationality of the company;
0o t h e r w i s e .
PARTNER—TRUST diﬀerence between the average trust in the company’s coun-
try citizens of the investor’s individual partners (based on
their country of birth) and TRUST.
US—EXPERIENCE (NO—US—EXPERIENCE) dummy variables that takes value 1 (or 0) if a venture cap-
ital investor has (or has not) partners with US work expe-
rience.
PHD (NO—PHD) dummy variables that takes value 1 (or 0) if the venture
capital investor has (or has not) partners with a doctoral
degree.Table 2
Descriptive statistics
This Table provides descriptive statistics for the potential and realized deal samples. We report the mean, minimum and
maximum values of the dependent and independent variables (except for industry dummies). For dummy variables we
report the frequency of observations. Variables are deﬁn e di nT a b l e1 .
POTENTIAL DEALS SAMPLE REALIZED DEALS SAMPLE
VARIABLE Mean Minimum Maximum Mean Minimum Maximum
Deal 0.012 0 1 — — —
Control Rights: Board — — — 0.386 0 1
Control Rights: Voting — — — 0.342 0 1
Control Rights: Liquidation — — — 0.317 0 1
Control Rights:Termination — — — 0.323 0 1
Control Rights Index — — — 1.296 0 4
Trust 0.204 0.037 0.716 0.434 0.071 0.716
Information 0.085 0 0.664 0.028 0 0.664
GDP Diﬀerence 0.106 0 0.618 0.056 0 0.283
Language Overlap 0.152 0 1 0.836 0 1
Legal Diﬀerence 0.178 0 1 0.872 0 1
Distance 6.720 0 9.322 3.829 0 9.176
Foreign Deal 0.893 0 1 0.180 0 1
Common Border 0.211 0 1 0.866 0 1
Industry Fit 0.144 0 1 0.365 0.017 1
Stage Fit 0.509 0 1 0.708 0.048 1
Early Stage 0.589 0 1 0.588 0 1
Tourism 0.083 0 0.401 0.013 0 0.400
Eurovision 0.334 —1.126 2.895 0.066 —0.440 2.723
FDI 0.083 0 0.693 0.032 0 0.456
Exports 0.093 0 0.469 0.021 0 0.469
Solicitation 0.441 0 2.617 — — —
Partner-Match 0.028 0 1
Partner-Trust 0.001 —0.302 0.200
US-Experience 0.548 0 1 — — —
PhD 0.361 0 1 — — —
High—Rule — — — 0.372 0 1
High—Procedural — — — 0.489 0 1
Independent-VC — — — 0.602 0 1
VC-Size — — — 4.486 1.300 4,100.000
VC-Age — — — 97.742 12 390
Number of observations 107,390 1,277
Number of companies 1,216 1,216
Number of deals 1,277 1,277
Number of venture ﬁrms 108 108Table 3: Correlations
This Table provides pairwise correlations (signiﬁcance levels in brackets) among the country-dyadic variables deﬁn e di nT a b l e1 .
Trust Inform. GDP Lang. Legal Foreign. Common Tourism Euro- Exports FDI





























































































































































This Table reports results of logit and conditional logit regressions with investor ﬁxed eﬀects for the potential deals
sample. The dependent variable is DEAL. Variables are deﬁned in Table 1. Company controls are complete sets
of dummies for each company’s country, industry and stage. Columns (i) and (ii) report results of logit regressions.
Columns (iii) and (iv) report results from conditional logit regressions. All models are discussed in Section 4.1. For each
independent variable, we report the estimated coeﬃcient and the z-score (in parenthesis) computed using (Huber-White)
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered by country-dyad. Values signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are



















































































Investor Fixed Eﬀects Included Included Included Included
Company Controls Included Included Included Included
Observations 107,390 107,390 107,390 107,390
Pseudo 2 0.4995 0.5031 — —
Number of venture ﬁrms 108 108 108 108
Number of companies 1,216 1,216 1,216 1,216Table 5
The eﬀect of trust: the role of venture partners’ nationality
This Table reports results of logit and conditional logit regressions with investor ﬁxed eﬀects that include measures of
venture partner nationality. The dependent variable is DEAL. Variables are deﬁned in Table 1. Control variables are
those used in columns (ii) and (iv) of Table 4. Company controls are complete sets of dummies for each company’s country,
industry and stage. Columns (i) and (ii) report results of regression models which include PARTNER-MATCH, while
columns (iii) and (iv) report results of regression models which include PARTNER-TRUST. These variables discussed in
Section 4.3.1 and deﬁned in Table 1. For each independent variable, we report the estimated coeﬃcient and the z-score
(in parenthesis) computed using (Huber-White) heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered by country-dyad.




























Control Variables Included Included Included Included
Investor Fixed Eﬀects Included Included Included Included
Company Controls Included Included Included Included
Observations 107,390 107,390 107,390 107,390
Pseudo 2 0.5079 — 0.5059 —
Number of venture ﬁrms 108 108 108 108
Number of companies 1,216 1,216 1,216 1,216Table 6
The eﬀect of trust: the role of education and experience
This Table reports results of variations of the logit and conditional logit regressions with investor ﬁxed eﬀects of the main
model of Table 4, where we take into account the education and experience of venture ﬁrms’ partners. The dependent
variable is DEAL. Columns (i) and (ii) correspond to the speciﬁcations that include country dyadic variables in Table
4. For each speciﬁcation we report the coeﬃcient of TRUST interacted with the US—EXPERIENCE and PHD dummy
variables, respectively. Variables as deﬁn e di nS e c t i o n1 .W ed on o tr e p o r tt h ec o e ﬃcients of all other variables. For the
interacted TRUST variables we report the coeﬃcient and the level of signiﬁcance; for each pair of coeﬃcients we also













Wald test (p-value) 4.72** (0.03) 3.00* (0.08)Table 7
Additional models
This Table reports results of logit and conditional logit regressions with investor ﬁxed eﬀects and country dyadic variables for the potential deals sample. The dependent
variable is DEAL. Variables are deﬁned in Table 1. Company controls are complete sets of dummies for each company’s country, industry and stage. Columns (i) and
(ii), report results of speciﬁcations that include TOURISM, columns (iii) and (iv) report results of speciﬁcations that include EUROVISION, columns (v) and (vi) report
results of speciﬁcations that include EXPORT, and columns (vii) and (viii) report results of speciﬁcations that include FDI. We report only the estimated coeﬃcients
for TRUST and the additional variable, and of their the z-score (in parenthesis) computed using (Huber-White) heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered by






















































Control Variables Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Investor Fixed Eﬀects Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Company Controls Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Observations 97,736 97,736 99,977 99,977 107,390 107,390 101,638 101,638
Pseudo 2 0.4961 — 0.5236 — 0.5055 — 0.5111 —
Number of venture ﬁrms 108 68 108 108 108 108 108 104
Number of companies 1,216 1,216 1,136 1,136 1,216 1,216 1,211 1,211Table 8
Foreign Subsamples
This Table reports results of logit and conditional logit regressions with investor ﬁxed eﬀects for the potential deals
sample. The dependent variable is DEAL. Variables are deﬁned in Table 1. The models and indepenedent variables
correspond to those of columns (ii) and (iv) of Table 4. Columns (i) and (ii) report results for the broad foreign sample.
Columns (iii) and (iv) report results for the narrow foreign sample. For each independent variable, we report the
estimated coeﬃcient and the z-score (in parenthesis) computed using (Huber-White) heteroskedasticity-robust standard
































































































Investor Fixed Eﬀects Included Included Included Included
Company Controls Included Included Included Included
Observations 49,104 49,406 8,734 8,734
Pseudo 2 0.4241 — 0.3323 —
Number of venture ﬁr m s 4 94 9 4 94 9
Number of companies 1,216 1,216 223 221Table 9
Contingent control rights
This Table reports results of poisson and logit regressions for the sample of realized deals. Column (i) reports re-
sults of a Poisson regression whose dependent variable is CONTINGENT—RIGHTS—INDEX. Columns (ii) through (v)
report results of logit regressions whose dependent variables are CONTINGENT—RIGHTS—BOARD, CONTINGENT—
RIGHTS—VOTING, CONTINGENT—RIGHTS—LIQUIDATION, and CONTINGENT—RIGHTS—TERMINATION. Vari-
ables are deﬁned in Table 1. Investor controls include a dummy for whether the venture ﬁrm is independent or cap-
tive (INDEPENDENT—VC), the venture ﬁrm’s size (VC—SIZE) and age (VC—AGE), and investor country ﬁxed ef-
fects. Company controls are complete sets of dummies for each company’s country, industry and stage. For each
independent variable, we report the estimated coeﬃcient and the z-score (in parenthesis) computed using (Huber-White)
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered by country-dyad. Values signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are
identiﬁed by ***, **, *.
Contingent Contingent Contingent Contingent Contingent
Rights: Rights: Rights: Rights: Rights:

























































































































Investor Controls Included Included Included Included Included
Company Controls Included Included Included Included Included
Observations 1,131 1,120 1,044 1,045 1,046
Pseudo 2 — 0.292 0.328 0.240 0.239Table 10
Trust and the quality of legal enforcement
This Table reports results of variations of the logit and poisson models of Table 9, where the eﬀect of trust takes diﬀerent
values for investment in countries with high/low values of the rule of law and procedural complexity indices. Depen-
dent variables are: CONTINGENT—RIGHTS—INDEX, CONTINGENT—RIGHTS—BOARD, CONTINGENT—RIGHTS—
VOTING, CONTINGENT—RIGHTS—LIQUIDATION, and CONTINGENT—RIGHTS—TERMINATION. Variables are
deﬁn e di nT a b l e1 . I ne a c hc o l u m nw er e p o r tt w oc o e ﬃcients, corresponding to the eﬀect of trust interacted with a
dummy for a high/low value of the legal enforcement index. Investor controls include a dummy for whether the ven-
ture ﬁrm is independent or captive (INDEPENDENT—VC), the venture ﬁrm’s size (VC—SIZE) and age (VC—AGE), and
investor country ﬁxed eﬀects. Columns (i) through (v) report results of regressions corresponding to those in Table 9,
without reporting the coeﬃcients of the other dependent variables. For each estimated coeﬃcient of trust interacted
with the legal enfocement dummy, we report the coeﬃcient and the level of signiﬁcance; for each pair of coeﬃecients; we
also report a Wald test for their diﬀerence and its p-value. Values signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are identiﬁed
by ***, **, *.
Contingent Contingent Contingent Contingent Contingent
Rights: Rights: Rights: Rights: Rights:











P a n e lA :R u l eo fL a w
Trust*Low—Rule 1.885 1.279 19.950*** 16.358* 5.832
Trust*High—Rule 5.361*** 12.052*** 30.434*** 18.299** 12.179***
Wald 2(1) (p-value) 11.85*** (0.00) 9.42*** (0.00) 3.11* (0.07) 0.29 (0.59) 2.81* (0.09)
P a n e lB :P r o c e d u r a lC o m p l e x i t y
Trust*Low—Procedural 2.320* 7.537 20.420*** 15.414* 4.862
Trust*High—Procedural 4.881*** 12.526** 28.271*** 17.509** 11.456**
Wald 2(1) (p-value) 7.24*** (0.00) 1.56 (0.21) 1.53 (0.22) 0.58 (0.44) 3.19* (0.07)Table 11
Heckman selection model
This Table reports results of linear two-step Heckman regressions. Columns (i) through (v) report results of regressions
whose dependent variables are variables are: CONTINGENT—RIGHTS—INDEX, CONTINGENT—RIGHTS—BOARD,
CONTINGENT—RIGHTS—VOTING, CONTINGENT—RIGHTS—LIQUIDATION, and CONTINGENT—RIGHTS—TERMINATION.
All variables are deﬁned in Table 1. Panel A uses the base model, with no excluded variables. Panel B uses the augmented
model, with three excluded variables. At the bottom of Panel B we report an F-test for the joint signiﬁcance of the three
instrumental variables. The model speciﬁcation for the outcome equation is the same as in Table 9. Investor controls
include a dummy for whether the venture ﬁrm is independent or captive (INDEPENDENT—VC), the venture ﬁrm’s size
(VC—SIZE) and age (VC—AGE), and investor country ﬁxed eﬀects. Company controls are complete sets of dummies for
each company’s country, industry and stage. In Panel A the model speciﬁcation for the selection equation is the same as
in column (ii) of Table 4; in Panel B it includes FDI, EXPORTS, and SOLICITATION. We report only the coeﬃcients
of TRUST and (for Panel B) of FDI, EXPORTS, and SOLICITATION. For each independent variable, we report the
estimated coeﬃcient and the z-score (in parenthesis) computed using (Huber-White) heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors, clustered by country-dyad. Values signiﬁcant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are identiﬁed by ***, **, *.
P a n e lA :B A S EM O D E L
Contingent Contingent Contingent Contingent Contingent

























































































































Investor Controls Included Included Included Included Included













Investor FE Included Included Included Included Included












Observations 107,388 107,388 107,388 107,388 107,388
Realized deals 1,131 1,129 1,091 1,103 1,124
Wald 2(54) 651.13 531.20 660.13 420.71 427.48P a n e lB :A U G M E N T E DM O D E L
Contingent Contingent Contingent Contingent Contingent

























































































































Investor Controls Included Included Included Included Included














































Investor FE Included Included Included Included Included












Observations 81,993 81,993 81,993 81,993 81,993
Realized deals 886 884 852 868 879
Wald 2(52) 683.74 428.95 780.64 400.93 448.25
F statistic (3) 54.34 54.26 38..25 52.29 53.49 
Figure 1: Trust and VC market size 
 
 
This figure shows the relationship between countries’ trust and the size of their venture capital market. Each observation represents a country in our dataset. 
Trust (received) is the average percentage of people who expressed high trust in the Eurobarometer data.  A value of 20 means that on average 20% of people 
expressed high trust. VC market size is measured as the total venture capital investments divided by the country’s per‐capita GDP, for the period 1998‐2001.  